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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Economic reform in the People’s Republic of China since 1978 has dramatically 
reoriented the country’s once-Soviet style planned economy toward the market, creating a 
vibrant, chaotic, high-growth economy in its place.  With these increased freedoms have come 
expanded social and material choices for Chinese people.  Notably, millions of rural Chinese 
have abandoned their plows to seek their fortunes in the city. 
¶2  However, these economic reforms have not yet led to a commensurate expansion of 
political rights for Chinese citizens.   To take one striking example, the Communist Party 
(“CCP” or “the Party”) has retained its household registration (“hukou”) system, which restricts 
the mobility of its population.  The massive rural-to-urban migration occurring in China, despite 
the presence of the hukou system, has altered the state’s ability to exercise power at both the 
national and local levels.  It has also disproportionately harmed Chinese of rural origin, who are 
burdened more heavily by the system than urban hukou holders.   
¶3  This paper will examine the effects of the hukou system on China’s political structure and 
on its migrants.  After discussing the origin of the household registration system and its Mao-Era 
effects on rural Chinese, it will explore its interplay with the post-1978 revival of mass migration 
of rural Chinese to urban centers.  Specifically, the paper will elucidate the economic and 
political opportunities these changes have created for the central and local governments, while 
also examining how this same interaction between migration and the continued implementation 
of the hukou system has damaged the ability of all levels of government to project power 
effectively.  Furthermore, the paper will explore how migrants themselves have affected and 
been affected by this tumultuous evolution.   
II. LIBERATION & THE BIRTH OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
¶4  Soon after the Communists defeated the KMT and founded the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”), the Party initiated a series of economic reform measures that ultimately, albeit 
inadvertently, led to the creation of the hukou system and the consequent legal segregation of 
urban and rural Chinese.  Following the Soviet economic model, Beijing’s planners hoped to 
extract China’s agricultural economic surplus to fuel urban industrialization. 1  To focus the 
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countryside’s energies on agricultural production for this purpose, the CCP collectivized 
agriculture and abolished the peasantry’s2 traditional sources of non-farming income, such as 
“handcrafts, small-scale livestock rearing, and petty trading.”3  Likewise, to facilitate the 
implementation of these reforms and preempt evasion, the government created household 
registration books (huji bu) for each family to allow the authorities to track the whereabouts of 
all rural Chinese.4   
¶5  Apart from fostering economic growth, the new industrialization program sought to 
ameliorate economic disparities between costal and inland urban centers that surfaced during the 
Republican period, and so mandated that “the greater part of the new industry . . . be located in 
the interior so that industry may gradually become evenly distributed.”5  From 1952 to 1957, 
non-costal provinces received over 58% of industrial investment, leading to a dramatic boost to 
urban living standards across the count ry.6   
¶6  Under these policies, new industries sprouted up in cities across the nation.  Rural 
Chinese everywhere were drawn by the wealth of the industrializing cities and their relatively 
prosperous inhabitants.  The allure of the urban areas, coupled with the poverty and economic 
devastation that pervaded the countryside (in part due to Beijing’s policies), left rural Chinese 
with one option for economic betterment: migration to the cities.  From 1949 to 1957, China’s 
cities absorbed up to 26.27 million individuals from the countryside,7 which accounted for 70% 
of urban growth. 8   
¶7  Fearing social unrest fomented by uncontrolled urban population growth and the 
unraveling of their economic plans, China’s State Council and the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and Labor began to issue directives to halt “blind” rural migration to the cities in 1953.9  In 1957 
the government established detention centers to return peasants to the countryside.  But all of 
these plans failed to stem the migration tide.  Finally, in 1958 the CCP issued a law that impeded 
migration and has distorted China’s socio-economic fabric to this day:  The Household 
Registration Regulations of the PRC.  Initially it seemed this policy too would not succeed, since 
the contemporaneous—and economically disastrous—Great Leap Forward witnessed the 
                                                                                                                                                             
553, 557 (1995) (reviewing MICHAEL R. DUTTON, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN CHINA: FROM PATRIARCHY TO 
“THE PEOPLE” (1992)).  For an alternate historical/cultural conception of the CCP’s economic program, see 
BARRINGTON MOORE , JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 179 (1966).   
2 It is important to note that the concept of “peasant,” or nongmin, as used in contemporary Chinese discourse lacks 
a deep historical context.  The term, imported from Japanese, first appeared in Chinese-English dictionaries in 1912.  
Traditionally, rural China had a highly diversified economy, with rural households participating in numerous light- 
or cottage-industries along with agriculture.  The concept of the peasant, in which an individual subsists almost 
entirely off of his agricultural production, is a modern invention in Chinese society—one made real, in part, by the 
imposition of the hukou system during the Mao Era.  Li Ling, Note, Towards a More Civil Society:  Mingong and 
Expanding Social Space in Reform-Era China, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 167-68 (2001); infra text 
accompanying note 3.    
3 R. J. R. KIRBY, URBANIZATION IN CHINA: TOWN AND COUNTRY IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY 1949-2000 AD 22 
(1985); cf. MOORE, supra note 1, at 179.   
4 DOROTHY J. SOLINGER, CHINA’S TRANSIENTS AND THE STATE:  A FORM OF CIVIL SOCIETY? 7 (USC Seminar Series 
No. 1, 1991).   
5 Mao Zedong, On the Ten Major Relationships, Address Before the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
(Apr. 25, 1956), in THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 284, 284-307 (1977).   
6 KIRBY, supra  note 3, at 110, 138.   
7 CHINA FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLISHING HOUSE, NEW CHINA’S POPULATION 58 (1988); see SOLINGER, 
supra note 4, at 7; He, supra note 1, at 180.   
8 KIRBY, supra  note 3, at 109.   
9 SOLINGER, supra  note 4, at 7; He, supra  note 1, at 180;  Ji, supra note 1, at 557.   
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ballooning of the urban population from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million four years later.10  
However, after this aberrant period of economic chaos passed, China’s migration levels 
collapsed and remained low until the late 1970s (See Fig. 111).12 
III. THE DIVISION OF RURAL & URBAN CHINA 
¶8  Beijing ostensibly created the hukou system “to maintain social order, protect citizens’ 
rights and benefits, and to serve in the construction of socialism.”13  Its most significant effect, 
however, was to employ the hujibu14 to erect a hereditary, matrilineal system that divided 
China’s agricultural and non-agricultural populations, and effectively bound the peasantry to the 
land they tilled.15  The Household Registration Regulations declared that:  
¶9 Article 6 
Citizens should register as permanent residents in the place they regularly reside.  
One citizen can only have permanent resident registration in one location.   
¶10 Article 7 
Within a month after the birth of an infant, the head of the household, relatives, 
parental guardians, or neighbors will file the registration of the baby’s birth at the 
institution responsible for registering permanent residency.  
Adoptive parents or an orphanage will file the registration of an orphan’s birth at 
the institution responsible for registering permanent residency.   
¶11 Article 10 
Before a citizen moves out of his registration’s jurisdiction, he or the head of the 
household will file registration for moving out of the jurisdiction at the institution 
                                                 
10 SOLINGER, supra  note 4, at 7; see SHENG LANG, RENKOU YU CHENGSHIHUA [POPULATION AND URBANIZATION] 
36 (1987) [hereinafter POPULATION AND URBANIZATION].   
11 CHINA FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLISHING HOUSE, supra note 7, at 59. 
12 See Mallee, supra note 1, at 136; He, supra  note 1, at 177, 180.   
13 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli [The Household Registration Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China] § 1 (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu 1958) [hereinafter Household Registration Regulations].   
14 See supra text accompanying note 4.   
15 Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, Huji Zhidu Gaige Zhuanti Baodao [A Report on the Special Subject of 
Household Registration System Reform], Nov. 2001, available at 
http://www.china110.com/police/plnews/gdjs/zhej/item/2001_11/574595.shtml [hereinafter Report on the Special 
Subject of HRSR]; Mallee, supra note 1, at 138;  SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 7; Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law 
Enforcement Campaigns as a Means of Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-Urban Migrant Enclave in 
Beijing, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 121, 122 (2003); Ji, supra note 1, at 557; Li , supra note 2, at 154;  Wo Guo 
Quanmian Tuijin Huji Zhidu Gaige [The Comprehensive Advancement of Our Country’s Household Registration 
System Reform], RENMIN RIBAO, Aug. 14, 2002, available at 
http://news.tfol.com/news/zhuanti/block/html/2003080100479.html [hereinafter Comprehensive Household 
Registration Reform]; Zhongguo Xianxing Huji Zhidu Wu Nian Zhi Nei Chedi Gaige [The Thorough Reform of 
China’s Current Household Registration System Five Years from Now], Tianfu Rexian, available at 
http://news.tfol.com/news/zhuanti/block/html/2003073100449.html [hereinafter The Reform of China’s Current 
HRS Five Years from Now].    
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responsible for household registration, obtain a certificate for moving, and nullify 
his household registration.   
 A citizen moving from a village to the city must hold proof from the city’s Labor 
Department, proof of a school’s acceptance, or proof of an immigration permit 
from the institution responsible for registering permanent residency of that city.  
He must then go to the institution responsible for registering his permanent 
residency and apply to go through emigration procedures . . .16   
¶12 Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulations legally compel every individual to become a part of the 
hukou system.17  Article 10, while superficially a delineation of the household registration 
transfer process, in practice prohibited nearly all such movements; the bureaucratic institutions 
controlling the hukou system, such as the Public Security Bureau (“PSB” or “Gonganju”) and 
work units (danwei), rarely provided the documents necessary to move.18   
¶13  Government policies that allocated “free compulsory education, urban employment, 
public housing, free medical services, and retirement benefits” to holders of urban hukou 
registration broadened the system’s urban/rural divide.19  Because those carrying agricultural 
registration received none of these benefits, which they could not otherwise acquire in an urban 
economy lacking even a rudimentary market system, they had to rely on the land to survive.  
Articles 15 and 16 of the Household Registration Regulations highlight the pervasive social 
controls the hukou system established: 
Article 15:  When a citizen temporarily resides outside of the place of his 
permanent residence for over three days, he or a household head of the place of 
temporary residence will register for temporary residence at the institution 
responsible for registering household registration within three days, and before 
leaving he will have it nullified.  An individual temporarily residing at a hotel will 
simultaneously register through the hotel for a traveler-registration registry.   
A citizen who permanently resides in the city and temporarily resides within that 
county or temporarily resides in a village outside his place of permanent residence 
does not need to register for temporary residency except, when temporarily 
residing at a hotel, for registering through a hotel for a traveler-registration 
registry.  
Article 16:  A citizen leaving his place of permanent residence for personal 
reasons must apply for a time extension or go through migration procedures at the 
institution responsible for household registration if the time for temporary 
                                                 
16 Household Registration Regulations, arts. 6-7, 10.   
17 See also id. art. 4 (explicating the distribution and implementation of household registries).   
18 See id. art. 3; Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, supra note 15; Mallee, supra note 1, at 138; He, supra note 
1, at 177; Li, supra note 2, at 155-56.   
19 Li, supra  note 2, at 156; see Zhejiang Province Propaganda Bureau, supra note 15; Mallee, supra  note 1, at 136, 
138; He, supra note 1, at 181; Ji, supra note 1, at 557; Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra note 
15; cf. Letter from Li Yu, Teacher, Chinese University of Geosciences, Wuhan, to Hayden Windrow (June 5, 2004) 
(on file with author); Letter from Miao Xun, Teacher, Chinese University of Geosciences, Wuhan, to Hayden 
Windrow (June 2, 2004) (on file with author).   
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residency exceeds three months; if the individual has neither reason for a time 
extension nor meets the conditions for migration, he must return to the place of 
his permanent residence.20 
¶14 Even in cases of temporary location changes, from vacation to attending family affairs, 
individuals had to register their movement with government authorities.  Furthermore, as the 
second part of Article 15 (and Article 1021) demonstrates, controls proved significantly more 
onerous for rural residents.  Apart from the rare employment, education, or work-transfer 
opportunity, it was virtually impossible to change residency. 22  With this system in place, Beijing 
could both exploit the agricultural sector to advance industrial development and ensure urban 
political stability to safeguard its power.   
IV.  ECONOMIC REFORM & SUBVERSION OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM 
¶15  Soon after rural economic reforms began under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese 
peasants—those whom Beijing had branded with agricultural hukou status—initiated a push 
against the government’s economic and social controls to sever “the invisible belt [of household 
registration] that restrained [their] free movement” that continues to this day. 23  In 1978 the 
government issued new policies to improve the economic plight of those working on agricultural 
collectives.24  Poorer regions, though, soon exceeded the regulation’s mandate and abolished the 
collectives in favor of a return to household farming.  Notwithstanding central government 
efforts, the trend spread across rural China.  In 1979 the Party responded by unveiling its policy 
of Contracting Output to the Household (bao chan dao hu), and in 1981, Contracting Work to the 
Household (bao gan dao hu) (“Household Responsibility System”), which just effectively 
legitimized the already-accomplished return to pre-Communist tenant farming.25  By 1983, 98% 
of rural households had decollectivized.26   
¶16  Abolition of the communes quickly led to the resurrection of rural and urban agricultural 
markets. This development in turn severed the vital link between urban household registration 
and the ability to survive in the city, since migrants no longer needed to depend on government 
grain distributions to procure food when away from their place of residence.27  The ability to 
survive in the cities independently of the state, in tandem with the reemergence of a 100-200 
                                                 
20 Household Registration Regulations, arts. 15-16.   
21 See supra text accompanying note 16.   
22 Mallee, supra note 1, at 140; Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra  note 15; cf. He, supra  note 
15, at 127.   
23 Comprehensive Household Registration Reform, supra note 15.   
24 See Department of International Cooperation & Department of Development Planning of the Ministry of 
Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, Reform from 1978, at http://www.cafte.gov.cn/5.htm (last modified 
Oct. 22, 2002).   
25 Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y. K. Woo, The “Worthy” Unemployed:  Societal Stratification and 
Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 457, 465-56 
(1995).  This legislative acceptance of events already occurred would become a hallmark of the post-1978 hukou 
reform regime.  See infra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
26 GORDON WHITE, RIDING THE TIGER:  THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN POST -MAO CHINA 100 (1993); see 
Peter Ho, Contesting Rural Spaces: Land Disputes, Customary Tenure and the State, in CHINESE SOCIETY, CHANGE, 
CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 93, 93, 95 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden, eds., 2d. 2003); Mallee, supra note 1, at 
136.   
27 He, supra note 1, at 181; see He, supra  note 15, at 124;  supra text accompanying note 19; cf. Mallee, supra note 
1, at 142; Li, supra note 2, at 156-57. 
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million-person rural labor surplus following decollectivization28 and the return of rural economic 
stagnation, 29 prompted renewed migration of millions of rural Chinese to urban areas in search of 
greater prosperity (See Fig. 230).  By 2002 there were an estimated 120 million internal migrants 
in China.31   
V. COMPETING AGENDAS: LOCAL RESPONSES TO RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
¶17  Confronted with an explosion of rural-to-urban migration, China’s local governments32 
have responded with numerous, often inconsistent policies that have varied over time and by 
region.  From the inception of the hukou system, the Chinese central government has delegated 
its enforcement to local authorities,33 often with little or inconclusive guidance.34  While this 
delegation of discretionary authority may have proven adequate based on the magnitude of 
migration in 1958, the original hukou system never envisioned the arrival of the market 
economy, and with it the unprecedented scale of “blind” migration the system was devised to 
combat.35   
¶18  The new realities of rural-urban migration have posed difficult challenges to the 
resources of local urban governments, which over time have erected formidable bureaucratic 
apparatuses to regulate migrants.  Apart from the statements of official national policy, the 
variety of offices, rules, measures, and fees designed to control and profit from the migrant 
population suggests that local governments in urban areas exercise the most pervasive and 
tangible authority of any political institution over migrants.  This haphazard, poorly regulated 
devolution of hukou enforcement has ensured that policies of different cities often diverge from 
and sometimes conflict with each other, and even flout promulgated national policy. These 
discrepancies admittedly point to underlying weaknesses and inconsistencies within household 
registration and Chinese migration law; but more insightfully, they reveal layers clashing 
objectives among different levels of government.   Furthermore, the consequences of this 
dynamic on the migrant population are not obvious and are often unpredictable.  A discussion of 
recent phenomena will suggest, however, that the migrants who bear the brunt of the 
discriminatory hukou system are not entirely without recourse and can potentially influence local 
governments to their advantage. 
                                                 
28 He, supra  note 1, at 181; He, supra note 15, at 124; cf. Mallee, supra note 1, at 136, 142; XU FENG, WOMEN 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM 68 (2000); Li, supra note 2, at 152.   
29 Mallee, supra note 1, at 142; SHENG, supra note 10, at 52; Li, supra  note 2, at 182; cf. id. at 162.   
30 REEITSU KOJIMA, URBANIZATION AND URBAN PROBLEMS IN CHINA 22 (1987); see Mallee, supra note 1, at 136.   
31 Neidi Liudong Renkou Gaoda Yier [Internal Migrants in Mainland reach 120 million high], Xindao Ribao, Oct. 7, 
2002, at China Section. 
32 The term “local government” as used herein encompasses all levels of government below the national 
government, including provincial and municipal people’s congresses, county governments, local PSBs, municipal 
administrative agencies, and the panoply of bureaucratic institutions whose authority touches the internal migrant 
population.  This article deals mostly with the actions of local governments in large cities.  For a description of the 
attitude of local governments in rural areas where migrants originate, see He, supra  note 1, at 183 (arguing that local 
home governments encourage and often facilitate migration). 
33 Id. at 181. 
34 See, e.g., Li, supra  note 2, at 159 (arguing that there is no central government agency responsible for regulating 
the migrant population). 
35 Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes 
(1998), available at http://csde.washington.edu/downloads /98-13.pdf. 
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A.  Beijing: Administrative Proliferation & Migrant Collusion 
¶19 The story of the last twenty years of migrant regulation in Beijing exemplifies many of the 
tensions among the actors who promulgate hukou law, those who enforce it, and those who are 
subject to it.  Official statistics report that as of 2003, of a total population of over 14.5 million, 
Beijing had over 4 million non-officially registered citizens; nearly 80% (3.19 million) of these 
non-urban hukou holders are migrant laborers and entrepreneurs.36  This figure is all the more 
remarkable as, until fairly recently, there existed no legal way for migrants to conduct business 
in Beijing.37 
¶20 The incremental loosening of restrictions on migrant economic activity in Beijing began 
with two regulations issued by the Beijing municipal government in 1991.38  These had two 
distinguishing features: they limited applications for petty business (getihu) licenses to those 
migrants with a pre-existing connection to a legal resident of Beijing, and they gave discretion to 
local administrative agencies to decide which documents were necessary to apply for a getihu 
license. The implications of the second characteristic resonate throughout the development of 
Beijing hukou and migrant regulation; the more closely Beijing has attempted to regulate non-
urban hukou holders, the more Byzantine the network of administrative agencies required to 
implement these regulations has become.   
¶21  A migrant attempting to establish a foothold in Beijing could potentially come into 
contact with a number of local institutions.  He39 might deal with the local public security bureau 
to apply for a Temporary Residence Permit.40  If the migrant intends to apply for a getihu 
license, he would do so through the Industry and Commerce Bureau (“ICB”), which is also 
responsible for checking migrant licenses and extracting regulatory fees.41  To rent housing from 
a local landlord, the migrant would have to register with the Housing and Land Bureau 
(“HLB”).42  If he had a wife or sister with him, she would have to apply for a marriage and 
fertility certificate from the Birth Control Committee (“BCC”) as a prerequisite to legally 
obtaining work or housing. 43   
                                                 
36 See Beijing Statistic Bureau, Beijing Shi Tongjiju 2003 Nian Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Tongji Gongbao 
[Beijing Statistics Bureau 2003 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Report] (Feb. 12, 2004), 
available at  http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/tjyl/tjgb/200402090012.htm. 
37 He, supra  note 1, at 186. 
38 Id. at 187.  These regulations included a directive, the Notice Regarding Several Questions on Getihu Registration 
and Permission, and the Management Measures on Migrants Conducting Business in Beijing. 
39 Although there are migrants of both sexes, men dominate migrant construction work, whereas female migrants 
can constitute up to 90% of the workforce in the (mostly southern) special economic zones. See Williams & Woo, 
supra  note 25, at 510-11.  For a more in depth look at the demographic makeup of the migrant workforce, see 
ZHONGGUO JINGJI KAIFAQU WAILAI RENKOU YANJIU [A STUDY OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT ZONES] 6-9 (Wu Yuping, ed., 1996) [hereinafter A STUDY OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION OF 
CHINA’S EDZS]. 
40 Li, supra  note 2, at 160-161.  On the other hand, according to a survey published in 1992, only 3% of formal 
migration to Beijing was approved by public security authorities.  Chan & Zhang, supra  note 35, at 11.  Of the 
remaining 97%, two-thirds were approved by other government departments.  Higher education institutions and the 
military accounted for the remainder of formal migrants. 
41 He, supra note 1, at 190-91. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; see also  Guangzhou City Public Security Bureau Consolidated Identification Processing Division, Shenban 
Fuqi Lai Shi Toukao Ruhu Xuzhi [What a Couple Applying for Household Registration to Come to the City to Join 
Their Partner Should Know] §§ 2-3, Aug. 18, 2003 (describing the various procedures required for a wife to obtain 
an urban hukou and join her husband in the city), available at 
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_039.htm; Guangzhou City Public Security Bureau Consolidated 
Identification Processing Division, Shenban Xiaohai Sui Fu (Huo Sui Mu) Lai Shi Ruhu Xuzhi  [What Those 
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¶22  One consequence of this decentralized oversight of migrants is that the various agencies 
with responsibility for internal migrants interpret policies in mutually conflicting ways.  Official 
hukou regulations relate the procedures for official migration, but not the precise qualifications; 
therefore, different departments can give different content to these procedures.44  For example, in 
the early 1990s the Beijing ICB created a migrant marketplace to decrease unlicensed migrant 
street-vending in the Chaoyang District.  The market flourished until the police, over whom the 
ICB exercises no authority, evicted the migrants, presumably because the market blocked 
traffic.45  A consideration of why the two authorities reacted with conflicting policies leads to the 
next key feature of local migrant regulation: the collection of fees. 
¶23  According to sections 44 and 45 of The Bylaws for the Implementation of the People’s 
Republic of China’s Resident Identification, all fees related to migration—temporary residence 
fees, registration & regulation fees, taxes, etc.—should accrue to the national government.46  By 
the admission of administrators themselves, however, local government offices pocket a 
percentage of most fees migrants pay. 47  In light of the number of migrants in major cities, these 
fees aggregate to constitute a major source of wealth for local governments.  Unsurprisingly, this 
profit potential spawns administrative behavior that runs counter to the nominal purpose and 
function of these agencies, which is to control migration. 48  Local bureaucracies instead have an 
incentive to preserve a migrant population high enough to boost local coffers, but not so high as 
to incur the disfavor of the central government. 
¶24  As one can imagine, the motley assortment of agencies that oversees migrant regulation 
is ill-equipped to maintain this delicate balance. At times, drastic measures are needed to appease 
the central government. A prime example of what might euphemistically be termed a 
“recalibration” of the migrant population is shown in the tumultuous history of Zhejiang Village 
in Beijing.49  In the early 1980s, migrants from Wenzhou in Zhejiang province began to settle in 
Fengtai (? ? ), on the outskirts of Beijing, and set up small businesses.  By 1986 thousands of 
Wenzhouese lived in the area, which came to be known as “Zhejiang Village.”  By 1994 nearly 
100,000 migrants populated the Village, in contrast to only 14,000 local residents.  These 
migrants played a major part in the local textile market, especially in the production of leather 
goods.  During this period, local authorities conducted sporadic “clean-up” campaigns, each time 
                                                                                                                                                             
Applying for Children to Obtain Household Registration to Come to the City with Their Father or Mother Should 
Know] § 3, (listing the myriad documents, including proof of birth control policy compliance, required for a child 
legally to follow one or both of her parents to the city), available at 
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_040.htm; Chusheng Shenbao Ruhu Xuzhi [What One Should 
Know About Registering a Birth and Obtaining Household Registration] § 2, Sept. 1999 (noting the birth control 
policy certification required for a child to receive urban hukou status), available at 
http://www.gzjd.gov.cn/jindun2/da04/DB02/c0006_010.htm.   
44 Chan & Zhang, supra  note 35, at 11; He, supra  note 1, at 186. 
45 He, supra  note 1, at 192-93. 
46 Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jumin Shenfenzheng Tiaoli Shishi Xize” Di Sishisi 
Tiao Di Sishiwu Tiao De Pifu  [The State Council’s Revision of Sections 44 and 45 of “The Bylaws for the 
Implementation of the People ’s Republic of China’s Resident Identification”] (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu Dec. 3, 
1991) (stipulating in § 45 that “all local fees estimated received go up to the national treasury”); Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Jumin Shenfenzheng Tiaoli Shishi Xize [The Bylaws for the Implementation of the People ’s Republic of 
China’s Resident Identification] § 45 (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu Nov. 1986) (stipulating that “all local fees estimated 
received go up to the national treasury”).   
47 He, supra note 1, at 192; see Corruption in China:  Shooting the Messenger, ECONOMIST , Sept. 4, 2004, at 43.   
48 He, supra  note 15, at 137. 
49 See id. for a detailed account and thorough analysis of Zhejiang Village.  The following recapitulation is drawn 
from both that article and from Mallee, supra  note 1, at 144. 
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forcing the migrants to relocate further outside Beijing or in surrounding Hebei Province.  In late 
1995 local police attempted to permanently raze the Village; 80,000 migrants were uprooted, and 
nearly fifty residential compounds were destroyed.  Despite the persistence and severity of local 
law enforcement, migrants began to return to the Village less than six months later; within a 
year, they began to rebuild their homes. 
¶25  The tale of Zhejiang Village reveals a great deal about the problems of hukou and 
migrant regulation.  From the perspective of the municipal government, the migrants in the 
Village are an exploitable resource.  Because officia l regulations governing internal migrants 
leave considerable discretion to administrative agencies, these agencies tailor the implementation 
of regulations in ways that maximize their own gain, both monetarily and in terms of the scope 
of their jurisdiction.50  The result in practical terms is that migrants can eke out an existence in 
Beijing, but at a price that includes a more onerous regulatory burden compared to urban hukou 
holders, along with rent extraction from local bureaucracies. 
¶26  The plight of Zhejiang Village suggests another, less quantifiable burden on internal 
migrants; the irregularity of clean-up campaigns creates an environment of unpredictability in 
which migrants remain unsure of their status within a city. The resulting need for greater 
foreseeability explains another peculiar consequence of migrant regulation: collusion between 
migrants and local officials.  Those bureaucrats who develop economic relationships with 
migrant workers51 derive tremendous economic advantages from the migrants’ semi- legal status 
and so do not comply with migrant regulations.52  These incentives permit migrants to engage in 
“legal collusion . . . to overcome . . . hostile legal regulation . . . .”53  Though the local officials in 
these “collaborative relationship[s]” behave in an economically parasitic manner, migrants still 
derive a net benefit, as evidenced by their willingness to often initiate the relationships.54  
Lacking political or social rights within the cities, they form guanxi, or connections, with local 
persons or entities to create a socio-economic space of their own, one with rules that, although 
harsh, are habitual and predictable.55  By strengthening migrant incentives to collude in order to 
form a bulwark against severe and capricious state action, the irregular clean-ups in Zhejiang 
Village and other migrant-populated localities across China accomplish precisely what they 
intend to thwart.56  Instead of cleansing the cities of the migrant presence, the cleanup campaigns 
strengthen the relationships between migrants and petty officials to the material benefit of both 
groups.  These ties lay the foundation for extra- legal social structures that protect migrants’ 
positions in urban areas and encourage more rural Chinese to leave the countryside.   
B.  Hukou Commodification: Overreaching or the Market at Work? 
¶27  The starkest of the conflicts between national policy and local implementation manifests 
itself in the phenomenon of hukou commodification.  For example, in 1991 the Dezhou region of 
                                                 
50 He, supra  note 1, at 205. 
51 See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.   
52 Mallee, supra note 1, at 137, 142, 150; Li, supra note 2, at 164; see also Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden, 
Introduction:  Reform & Resistance in Contemporary China, in CHINESE SOCIETY, CHANGE, CONFLICT AND 
RESISTANCE  3, 14 (Elizabeth J. Perry  et al. eds., 2003) (2000); He, supra note 15, at 137; supra text accompanying 
notes 47-48.   
53 He, supra note 15, at 129.   
54 See id. at 129-30; cf. id. at 131 (discussing migrant collusion with locals to avoid adverse implementation of local 
laws).     
55 See Li, supra note 2, at 164-65.   
56 He, supra  note 1, at 205. 
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Shandong Province publicly announced the price of an official urban registration. 57  It is difficult 
to imagine a practice more at odds with the objective of controlling rural-urban migration; 
offering urban hukou at a price can only increase the number of a region’s migrants.58  Though 
exorbitant prices of these “economic hukou” (jingji hukou) were prohibitive for most migrants,59 
the soaring demand for urban hukou justified the introduction of the program for the local 
government: 
At places where the transaction . . . took place, long lines formed [and] traffic was 
blocked. . . . Peasants in surrounding villages and townships filled satchels and 
flour bags with money they had earned by their blood and sweat and had saved 
for several years to conduct [the]transaction . . . .60 
¶28 In effect, local governmental institutions reap profits by ‘liberating’ rural Chinese from the 
legal constraints Beijing has forced upon them through the hukou system; bureaucrats skim off 
the arbitrage-cost differential between urban and agricultural registration status.  It is important 
to note that even in these circumstances, repugnant as they appear, migrants themselves have 
proven willing to bear the costs of obtaining urban hukou status.61  They, more than other agents 
in the public or private sphere, have pushed against the system and weakened Beijing’s control.  
As the popular idiom among migrants states, “there are policies on high but those below have 
countermeasures” (shang you zhengce, xia you duice).62   
¶29 The commodification of hukou by lower levels of government was not passively accepted 
by the national government.  The Ministry of Public Security (Gonganbu) first issued an order in 
1992 banning the sale of urban hukou,63 yet the practice flourished in spite of the central 
government’s repeated warnings.64  The Sichuan Yearbook 1993, for example, openly admitted 
that 50% of the growth of the non-agricultural population was due to these economic 
registrations.65  However extortionate the practice of urban-hukou sale may appear, especially 
considering that were it not for the continued implementation of the hukou system itself this 
problem would not exist, one cannot deny the widespread demand among migrants.  For many, 
purchasing an urban hukou may be the only avenue for obtaining political, social, and economic 
rights. 
                                                 
57 Mallee, supra  note 1, at 147. 
58 It is interesting to note, however, that the central government itself has experimented with hukou 
commodification, most notably in the “blue-stamp” urban hukou program.  Introduced in 1992, the Ministry of 
Public Security (Gonganbu) (? ? ? ) offered urban hukou in small cities, towns, and special economic zones 
(SEZs) to those migrants who made “significant contributions” to the urban economy.  The criteria for blue-stamp 
hukou eligibility are typically broad and multivalent. See Chan & Zhang, supra  note 35, at 21-22. 
59 The price varied by region, ranging from a few thousand Ren Min Bi (RMB, the currency unit of the PRC)) up to 
50,000.  According to one estimate, by early 1994 three million urban hukou books had been sold to migrants, 
accumulating revenues of RMB 5 million.  See id. at 21, 26. 
60 Mallee, supra note 1, at 147-48. 
61 Id. at 148; see infra  note 66; cf. He, supra note 15, at 131.     
62 Mallee, supra note 1, at 148. 
63 Id. 
64 Chan & Zhang, supra  note 35, at 25. 
65 Mallee, supra  note 1, at 148. 
 11 
C.  Silent Masses: The Costs of Migrant Organization & Resistance 
¶30  The various manifestations of local government authority over migrant regulation paint a 
bleak picture: between rent extraction, hukou sales, and unpredictable clean-up campaigns, it 
seems that migrants are victims of the extortionate implementation of an already unfair 
institution.  Yet, as noted, migrants continue to flock to cities in growing numbers.66  A question 
lurks behind this paradox: do rural-urban migrants have any say over the policies that control 
their lives? 
¶31  The most fundamental obstacle to migrant organization is legal.  For a non-governmental 
organization of migrants to be officially recognized, it must be approved by professional 
superiors or a responsible government branch. 67  Because migrant laborers and entrepreneurs are 
excluded from urban civic franchise, it would be difficult for a group to find a sponsor 
organization; the political risk assumed by such a sponsor would make the project untenable.68  
However, there have been a number of informal migrant organizations, most of which attempt to 
play the role of a trade association, guaranteeing product quality and initiating public relations 
campaigns.69 
¶32  Although attempts to carve out a legitimate role through informal associations are 
laudable and generally more realistic than organized resistance to unfair policies, there have been 
isolated instances of migrants successfully combating local governments.  In 1986 a group of 
several hundred migrant traders in Tianj in’s Hexi District, frustrated with excessive assessment 
of fees, surrounded and physically assaulted local tax and public security officers.70  A more 
significant act of resistance arose in Beijing’s  Zhejiang Village in 1994; there a group of migrant 
traders sustained a strike for a week until local authorities agreed to charge fewer discretionary 
fees.71  These isolated examples suggest that, since the revenue derived by local governments 
from migrants is earned on a quasi- legal basis, an organized group of migrants can target those 
practices that are most suspect.  In other words, due to the illicit means by which local officials 
extract benefits from migrant workers, who already greatly contribute to urban economic growth 
and thereby help maintain a rather apolitical urban population, to a certain degree migrants can 
employ both the potential ire of the central government and the threat of general economic 
instability against local officials to achieve their political goals.   
¶33  Limited evidence points to the potential for successful migrant organization.  In Wuxi 
County, for example, there is a large group of migrant transport workers under the leadership of 
one migrant.72  Local bureaucrats have developed relations with this man, resulting in his 
                                                 
66 Interview with Men Nixia, migrant worker, (June 23, 1997) (revealing that she came from her village to Beijing to 
work to supplement her family’s income and “to see the world”); Interview with Mi Yun, migrant worker, (June 23, 
1997) (explaining that she migrated to the city “to see the world,” but primarily to provide her family with a more 
stable income than could be acquired back home); Interview with Zhang Shan, migrant worker, (June 23, 1997) 
(telling how she came to work in Beijing to provide a stable income to supplement her parents’ farming income); see 
China on the Move, ECONOMIST , Jul. 6-12, 1996, at 33 (noting that migrant remittances comprise an average of 20% 
of rural household income).   
67 Li, supra  note 2, at 171. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 176.  Besides these commercially-oriented groups, there have also been clinics and schools established 
solely by and for migrants.  These, however, are subject to the same sudden and categorical action as occurred in 
Zhejiang Village. 
70 Mallee, supra  note 1, at 149. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 153. 
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controlling a monopoly over most of the county’s transport work.73  Although the group has done 
little to change the legal status of migrant laborers, it has a certain degree of bargaining power 
because of its size and strict organization. 
¶34  These instances serve as a reminder that migrant regulation by local government is a two-
way street.  To the extent that administrative agencies wish to profit from migrant labor, the 
migrants are a necessary presence.  Theoretically—and one should not forget that any 
prescriptions for migrant empowerment are speculative—migrants can leverage their numbers 
into an amelioration of local policies.  In this particular task they have an ally, oddly enough, in 
the central government.  In one of several peculiar alignments of incentives, Beijing, for obvious 
fiscal reasons, also has an interest in eliminating local discretionary fees.   
¶35 In 2004 the Ministry of Finance issued a directive banning all irrational surcharges by local 
governments on rural laborers in cities.74  The cynical reaction to this promulgation is that the 
central government will never enforce the directive to the extent necessary to eradicate rent 
extraction.  Nevertheless, the directive derogates from the authority of local governments; it 
strips the veneer of legal justification from the exploitation of migrants by administrative 
agencies.  A result of this loss of validity is that well-organized groups of migrants can have 
enhanced bargaining power.  The threat of suppression and reprisal by the state looms over any 
overt expression of resistance, but this is a relatively constant factor.  Insofar as the migrant 
population has any opportunity to assert itself, there are no risk-free strategies.  Now that the 
central government has officially condemned the major direct benefit local governments procure 
from the migrant population, migrants have more rhetorical momentum behind them than ever 
before. 
VI. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REACTIONS & RESPONSES 
¶36  In contrast to the mixed, often ambivalent reaction of local governments, the central 
government has grown ever-more alarmed at the post-1978 ‘emancipation’ of migrant labor from 
the communes, since Beijing can no longer effectively monitor a large segment of the 
population. 75  Government enforcement of the hukou system, traditionally one of its most potent 
tools to control population mobility in the face of the massive number of rural migrants in 
China’s towns and cities,76 has failed.  As already discussed, household registration restrictions 
have spawned unlikely alliances between migrant workers and local urban private and public 
institutions.  These alliances in turn have fractured the central government’s ability to exercise its 
political will.  Ironically, by creating perverse incentives for public institutions and private actors 
to disobey government policies, the semi- legality of migrants’ urban presence that the hukou 
system itself creates has exacerbated this impotence.  Yet simultaneously, the negative reactions 
of urban Chinese to their newly arrived rural brethren actually bolster approval of those state 
institutions of oppression that appear to check migrant behavior, such as the Public Security 
Bureau; thus, by a circuitous route,  the hukou system buttresses the CCP’s legitimacy.   
                                                 
73 Id. at 154. 
74 Surcharges on Chinese Migrant Workers to Be Terminated, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 29, 2004. 
75 Mallee, supra note 1, at 136; Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 14; He, supra note 1, at 177; He, supra note 15, at 
137.   It is important to note that “[t]hree types of governments . . . have jurisdiction over internal migrants:  the 
central government, the local home government, and the local host government.”  He, supra note 1, at 182. 
76 According to Public Security Bureau and other “experts,” in 2002 China already had over 110 million migrant 
workers; the number likely surpasses 130 million today.  He, supra note 1, at 177; Comprehensive Household 
Registration Reform, supra note 15.   
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¶37  Nonetheless, bureaucrats clearly benefit from flouting the central government’s will.  
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in a February 2002 article from the Xinhua News Agency, 
the Vice-President of the Ministry of Public Security’s Bureau of Public Order, Bao Suixian, 
declared that the Household Registration System “cannot be eliminated” as it constitutes the 
“foundation . . . for managing social order” and has “great effect on fighting crime.”77  Among 
its other pertinent state uses, he noted that hukou also helps determine “family bloodline 
relationships.”78  His first two justifications carry little weight since the government has utterly 
failed to control the migration process and increasing crime rates.  The last simply smacks of a 
desperate attempt to validate the system by any means.  The underlying institutional motivations 
behind these justifications appeared most brilliantly when Bao advocated the right of free 
movement within the country for all citizens, but continued to insist China would still need 
hukou ((even though its function will have become moot, and national identity cards 
(shenfenzheng) are already widespread)).79  More convincingly, the central Gonganbu supports 
the hukou system because it provides its local branches with financial support.  As would be 
expected, competition between different administrative organs to extract rent from migrants 
further hampers implementation of the law.80     
¶38  As early as 1982 Beijing recognized the difficulty of coordinating its migrant 
management policies with local institutions, but did not overtly comprehend the underlying 
causes.  The Announcement of the State Council’s Approval of the Ministry of Public Security’s 
Request for Instructions Regarding Solving the Problem of Taking Up Residence Away from the 
Village noted that   
[r]ecently the number of people in the country without household registration has 
been very large, attracting great repercussions of every kind and having influence 
on the People’s lives and the stability of social order.  Every level of the People’s 
government must pay great attention to this issue, strengthen its leadership, and 
closely coordinate with every related institution to carry out effective measures.  
Every level must help those without household registration to settle down and 
work, conscientiously safeguarding  migration of the Masses according to 
national policies and regulations, and help them settle down with rights and 
benefits according to the law. 81   
¶39 Beyond expressing Party fear of wandering migrants,82 the Announcement’s repeated 
emphasis on coordination between government agencies at all levels to carry out national 
                                                 
77 Gonganbu:  Huji Zhidu Bu Hui Quxiao, Hukou Qianyi Jixu Fangkuan [Ministry of Public Security:  The 
Household Registration System Cannot Be Eliminated, Hukou Transfer Continued to Be Relaxed], XINHUA SHE, 
Feb. 2, 2002, available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2002/Feb/111419.htm [hereinafter Ministry of Public 
Security:  The HRS Cannot Be Eliminated, Hukou Transfer Continued to Be Relaxed].   
78 Id.   
79 Id.   
80 He, supra note 1, at 192.   
81 Guowuyuan Pizhuan Gonganbu Guanyu Jiejue Youguan Nongcun Luohu Wenti De Qingzhi De Tongzhi 
[Announcement of the State Council’s Approval of the Ministry of Public Security’s Request for Instructions 
Regarding Solving the Problem of Taking Up Residence Away from the Village] (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu 1982) 
[hereinafter State Council’s MPS Request Response].   
82 See Gonganbu Guanyu Jiejue Youguan Nongcun Luohu Wenti De Qingzhi (Shangyao) [The Ministry of Public 
Security’s Request for Instructions Regarding Solving the Problem of Taking Up Residence Away from the Village 
(Summary)] (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu) [hereinafter MPS Request]. 
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policies highlights the obstacles facing Beijing’s ability to govern.  However, the document gives 
no indication that the central government understood the problem to derive from active 
coordination between local officialdom and migrants; it simply treats these circumstances as a 
product of inept local governance.    
¶40  Similarly, the opportunistic, ad hoc partnerships between migrants and local officials 
have also neutered the Chinese government’s multiple regulations that aspire to manage 
migratory flow. 83  At best, national- level reforms have marked tacit acceptance of the (migrant-
created) status quo.84  In 1984 the State Council’s Notification on the Question of Peasants 
Entering Towns tried to divert migrants away from the largest cities toward small towns and 
villages in a policy labeled “litu bulixiang”, or “leave the land but not the countryside”. 85  By 
funneling rural Chinese to small- and medium-sized towns rather than the country’s largest 
cities, the government hoped to thwart the rise of social instability in urban areas.86  
Economically self-sufficient migrants who did not require state aid for food and housing could 
change their hukou status to “‘urban registration with self-supplied grain’ (zili kouliang 
chengzhen hukou)”.87  Unfortunately for Beijing, the policy’s principal effect was not a diversion 
of migrants toward towns and villages; instead, mixed-hukou families, a result of the matrilineal 
design of the Household Registration Sys tem, formed the bulk of those who took advantage of 
the law “by giving the ‘agricultural’ members (mostly women) official urban status.”88  Migrant 
families hijacked the law to legalize their previously unregistered presence in urban areas.  And 
now, twenty years later, Beijing has proposed another hukou reform that would “enabl[e] 
migrants residing in small and medium-sized cities to become local residents.”89  Likely, the 
results this time will scarcely differ.  
A.  Poor Peasants, Urban Disgust & Legitimization of Communist Control 
¶41  While the migrant presence in cities has tremendously enhanced the vibrancy of the 
country’s economy and benefited most urban residents,90 much to the consternation of the Party, 
it has also amplified social tensions in urban areas between legal urban residents and the 
migrants.91  Ironically, in contrast to the central government’s incessant policy defeats in the 
realm of migration control, this unintended dual socio-economic role for rural-hukou migrants—
as individuals who power urban economic growth and concurrently annoy those legally residing 
in the cities—has actually buttressed the CCP’s power via an odd combination of boosting urban 
residents’ quality of life and bringing renewed legitimacy to the state’s instruments of 
oppression. 92   
                                                 
83 See Mallee, supra note 1, at 145, 147; Li, supra note 2, at 154.     
84 Mallee, supra note 1, at 140-41.   
85 Id. at 145, 148; see Guowuyuan Guanyu Nongmin Jinru Jizhen Luogu Wenti De Tongzhi [State Council’s 
Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns] (Nongcun Fagui Quanshu 1984) [hereinafter State 
Council’s Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns]; He, supra note 1, at 182.   
86 See supra text accompanying note 9.   
87 Mallee, supra note 1, at 145; see State Council’s Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns, supra 
note 85.     
88 Mallee, supra note 1, at 145.  80% of the registrants were women; 84% had relatives in town, usually including at 
least a spouse.  Id.   
89 Migrants May Register for Equal Rights, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 6, 2004, at 
http://www.cpirc.org.cn/en/enews20040107.htm.   
90 See Report on the Special Subject of HRSR, supra  note 15; Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 4.   
91 Cf. Mallee, supra note 1, at 150.   
92 Report on the Special Subject of HRSR, supra  note 15; SOLINGER, supra  note 4, at 5.   
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¶42  By becoming urban economic actors, migrants maintain otherwise moribund urban 
industries;93  
supply[] vegetables to the cities and so work[] against inflation; stock[] its 
markets and servic[e] its “proper” city residents; . . . [and] empty[] out the 
countryside and so solv[e] problems of rural under-development, poverty and 
rural unemployment.94   
¶43 They also regularly take on the “dirty, dangerous, and degrading” jobs more prosperous 
city dwellers will not perform. 95  Essentially, they act as an economic mortar, filling the labor 
and supply gaps that would otherwise pervade the urban market, and strengthening the edifice of 
the current (government-maintained) economic system.   
¶44  Nevertheless, urban residents often overlook migrants’ economic contributions and 
regard rural Chinese as economic competitors and the source of China’s urban social ills.96  
Popular lore holds that migrants place great pressure on urban infrastructure and government 
finances;97 specifically, they purportedly inconvenience urban residents by overburdening 
housing, education, sanitation, electricity, traffic, and even food-service conditions.98  
Furthermore, urbanites believe migrants have greatly contributed to increasing crime rates and 
rampant excess births outside of the population control system. 99  In effect, urban Chinese hold 
migrants responsible for all social afflictions, from economic instability and drug dealing, to 
general disruption of the social peace.100 
¶45  On the economic front, reforms have eroded urban residents’ job stability, and incoming 
migrants have exacerbated this stress by increasing labor market competitiveness.101  Aside from 
simply adding to the labor pool, migrants have fallen into a role akin to illegal immigrants in 
other countries because of their agricultural hukou status.102  They receive few or no institutional 
protections, permitting employers to hire, fire, and pay them at abnormally low cost.103  The 
legal disabilities foisted upon rural hukou-holding Chinese erode the comparative advantage of 
urban Chinese with respect to migrants in the urban labor market, thereby making urban Chinese 
workers relatively unattractive to hire.  Consequently, just as one finds in other countries, urban 
residents believe the ‘illegal alien’ migrants subvert their economic opportunities.   
¶46  For example, the semi- legal migrant labor market the hukou system has created104 
exacerbates the social strains caused by the failure of the planned economy’s state-owned 
                                                 
93 See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.   
94 SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 5.   
95 Li, supra  note 2, at 182; see Mallee, supra note 1, at 137; Williams & Woo, supra note 25, at 510.   
96Report on the Special Subject of HRSR, supra  note 15;  SOLINGER, supra  note 4, at 5.     
97 Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 14; He, supra note 1, at 177-78, 183; Li, supra note 2, at 154-55.   
98 Report on the Special Subject of HRSR, supra note 15;  A STUDY OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION OF CHINA’S EDZS, 
supra note 39, 12-13. 
99 A STUDY OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION OF CHINA’S EDZS, supra note 39, at 13; Mallee, supra note 1, at 138, 
150; Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 4, 14; He, supra note 1, at 178, 183.   
100 A STUDY OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION OF CHINA’S EDZS, supra note 39, at 13; Williams & Woo, supra note 25, 
at 510.    
101 Report on the Special Subject of HRSR, supra note 15; He, supra note 1, at 178; cf. Williams & Woo, supra note 
25, at 467-68.   
102 XU, supra note 28, at 125; Williams & Woo, supra note 25, at 510-11; He, supra note 15, at 127. 
103 SOLINGER, supra note 4, at 4; see Williams & Woo, supra note 25, at 510-11; Li, supra note 2, at 151, 164, 169-
70.   
104 See Li, supra note 2, at 156.   
 16 
enterprises (“SOEs”).  As SOEs have shed millions of urban-hukou employees in desperate 
attempts to reduce financial losses, they have turned to migrants as less expensive replacements 
and “a path to easy profit ability.”105  By facilitating massive job displacement among urban 
Chinese, who once received lifetime employment guarantees from the government as a part of 
Mao’s fabled ‘iron rice bowl’ (tie fanwan), job market competition between those with urban 
hukou and those with agricultural hukou registrations has spawned destabilizing tensions within 
urban areas.106   
¶47  Consequently, because urban residents disdain migrants for the perceived social and 
economic problems they create, the periodic government campaigns to deport them and “strike 
hard” against (migrant) criminals (regardless of the tier of government that instigates them) 
receive broad support among urbanites despite the campaigns’ ambiguous effects.107  By 
ostensibly addressing one of the greatest concerns among urban Chinese—protecting the cities 
from this dangerously “unaccountable, untraceable, [and] hard to control” group—the central 
government burnishes its own image along with that of its repressive institutions at the expense 
of its rural citizens.108   
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶48  Within the three decades following China’s opening to the world, the hukou system has 
changed from a policy designed to glean the economic surplus of rural China to fuel urban 
industrialization into a bewildering hodgepodge of legal constraints that inadvertently aid 
economic growth and simultaneously preserve the aura of the state’s mandate to rule.  Though 
maintaining the household registration system has created various unexpected benefits for 
government officials at national and local levels, for urban residents, and even for China’s 
economy as a whole, the system has invariably done so in an inefficient manner that facilitates 
economic and social violence against the country’s most vulnerable citizens—its peasants.  
Perhaps even more worrying due to its grand scale and unforeseeable implications, Beijing’s 
desire to control migratory behavior through hukou restrictions has undermined the state’s 
overall ability to project non-violent power and to implement the rule of law. 109  Despite the 
media’s incessant fawning over the mammoth economic potential of China’s growing market 
and its assured future status as a great power, Beijing’s inability to govern effectively and to 
establish a sound legal system will significantly postpone the day that vision reaches fruition.     
                                                 
105 He, supra note 15, at 131; see XU, supra note 28, at 69; Mallee, supra note 1, at 142; Perry & Selden, supra note 
52, at 3-4, 14; supra  text accompanying note 65.   
106 Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 14; Williams & Woo, supra note 25, at 469-70.   
107 Cf. He, supra note 1, at 180, 196, 203-04 (noting how periodic anti-migrant campaigns by the Beijing 
government fail in their goal of migrant-control and further erode state power).   
108 Mallee, supra note 1, at 139, 151; Perry & Selden, supra note 52, at 4.   
109 See He, supra note 15, at 137, 145.   
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